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SECURITIES OVERVIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

In three of the four Tenth Circuit cases decided under the
federal securities laws during the period of this survey, the very
existence of a security was the issue litigated.' Where novel
schemes have been outside the literal language of the Securities
Acts,' it has been necessary to compare the specific facts of each
scheme with the definition of an "investment contract ' 3 that has
coalesced from Supreme Court decisions in SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp.,' SEC v. WJ. Howey Co.,5 and United Housing
Foundation,Inc. v. Forman.' There is no conflict as such in this
line of authority; yet a subtle shifting of emphasis in language
from one case to another has produced different results in close
cases. 7
Courts have discovered investment contracts related to such
underlying assets as whiskey warehouse receipts," beaver,' silver
I See Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978); Crowley v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978); McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of
Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977).
The fourth case, Hassig v. Pearson, 565 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1977), was brought under
the anti-fraud section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). It was litigated on the merits, but its significance is limited; the Tenth Circuit
merely affirmed the finding of the trial court that the facts did not support the allegation
of fraud.
Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. i 77(b) (1976) provides:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires-(1) The term
"security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase,any of-the -foregoing.
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10)(1976),
sets forth a similar definition. The Supreme Court has noted that the two definitions are
"virtually identical." Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
See text accompanying notes 19, 28, and 33 infra.
4 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
4 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 19-35 infra.
Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
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foxes,' 0 and gold coins." Indeed, state securities officials have
recently challenged promoters of worm breeding schemes., 2 The
Tenth Circuit has considered and rejected a residential subdivision lot,'3 a loan commitment," and a franchise' 5 as investment
contracts. These latter transactions may not be as exotic as the
former, but they are undeniably significant to the practitioner.
II. REAL ESTATE: Woodward v. Terracor, Inc. ,'
That a transaction which purports to be a real estate transaction may be a security is not debatable.' 7 In Woodward, however,
the Tenth Circuit was asked to find that the sale of a lot in a
residential subdivision constituted an investment contract.
A. Facts of the Case
Terracor, a developer, promoted Stansbury Park as a
planned residential community with an impressive array of
amenities.'" The plantiffs, who had purchased lots in the development, charged that it was "dying on the vine," although there
was a factual dispute as to the actual status of the project.', Some
of the plantiffs apparently intended to build on the lots for their
own use, while others purchased solely for speculative purposes.
The alleged misrepresentations of the developer formed no part
of the written agreement between the parties.
B. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. identified an
" SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).

SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Dist., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Machalaba, Many States Worry About Using Worms to Lure Investors, Wall St,
J., June 5, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
" Woodward v. Terracor, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978).
" McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645
(10th Cir. 1978).
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978).
, 574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (fee simple interests in tracts
containing citrus groves); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (assignments of oil leases); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973) (real estate joint
venture); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) (fractional interests in oil and
gas leases). See also, Clurman, Condominiums as Securities:A CurrentLook, 19 N.Y.L.F.
457 (1974).
" 574 F.2d at 1025. The amenities were to include shopping, transporation, recreation, health, and cultural facilities.
Is Id.
"
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investment contract as a "contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party ...
."20 Judge Breitenstein applied the facts to this
test and failed to find any evidence of a common enterprise binding the plaintiffs to Terracor.1' In particular, the only contractual
agreement between the parties was a standard real estate con22
tract; there was no collateral management contract.
The court cited ample support for its approach in the opinions of several federal district courts.2 However, Judge Breitenstein was forced to distinguish the Tenth Circuit's own contrary
precedent established by McCown v. Heidler.2 1 In McCown the
defendants had "contractually promised" to complete certain
projects which would have enhanced the value of the plaintiffs'
lots,2 whereas Terracor's contractual obligation was apparently
limited to delivery of title."
C.

Analysis

The decision of the court might have been correct either as
a syllogistic application of Howey or as a response to the Supreme
Court's current restrictive posture toward the securities laws.2
328 U.S. 293, 298-99.
" 574 F.2d at 1025.
', Id. In Howey, a collateral management contract enabled the investors to rely solely
upon the efforts of the promoter to pick the citrus crop, market it, and distribute the
profits. The investors lacked the knowledge, skill, and equipment to do the job themselves.
328 U.S. at 296.
12 Davis v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Happy
Investment Group v. Lakewood Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Il1. 1969). Contra, Fogel
v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jenne v. Amrep Corp. [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,343 (D. N.J. Feb. 14, 1978).
527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 209. It is not clear from the opinion whether the promises were limited to
material contained in the traditional real estate documents, or whether promises made
in conversations and brochures were included.
* 574 F.2d at 1025, 1027.
* Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292 (1977) (§ 10(b) will not be available to minority shareholders in a short form merger absent a misrepresentation); Piper
v. Chris Craft Indus. Inc., 97 S.Ct. 926 (1977) (defeated tender offeror has no cause of
action against successful competitor); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(plaintiff must prove "scienter" in suits brought under § 10(b)); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff must have been a "purchaser" or
"seller" to pursue a § 10(b) remedy). See generally, Lowenfels. Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891
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However, the facile distinction between McCown and
Woodward-whether or not the representations were part of the
written agreement between the parties-is not entirely satisfactory. One could infer that Professor Loss would not support the
distinction, although the Tenth Circuit confidently quoted from
his treatise:
[N]o "investment contract" is involved when a person invests
in real estate, with the hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result
of a general increase in values concurrent with the development of
the neighborhood, as long as he does not do so as part of an enterprise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood that property
will be developed or operated by others.u

It is reasonable to conclude that it would be necessary to go
beyond the written agreement of the parties to examine their
express or implied understandings.
Perhaps the court had extended itself too far in McCown by
relying on the more general language of Joiner.2' In that early case
the test for an investment contract was formulated as:
what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms
of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as this
it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as being
what they were represented to be."

Joiner made no distinction between written and oral representations. One could easily imagine an overzealous developer's oral
representations holding out inducements such that an investment
contract might exist in the sale of a residential lot. In the recent
case of Jenne v. Amrep Corp.,3' which cited McCown with approval, the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey
detailed the economic inducements offered and examined all rep(1977); Ruppert, The Supreme Court's Trimming of the Section 10(b) Tree: The Cultivation of a New Securities Law Perspective, 3 J. CoR' L. 112 (1977).
574 F.2d at 1026 (quoting 1 Loss, Szcuarrws RFULATION 491-92 (2d ed. 1961))
(emphasis added).
- 320 U.S. 344 (1943).

In McCown, the Tenth Circuit said: "In characterizing the purchase of... lots, the
standard set out in SEC v. C.M. JoinerLeasing Corp., must be applied .... " 527 F.2d
at 208. The court described the enthusiatic marketing techniques of the promoters in great
detail. For example, the court observed that the brochures "covered such topics as 'the
secret in speculating in raw land,' capital gain and real estate and fortunes, large and
small are being made in land." Id. at 210.
3
320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943).
3, 11978 Transfer Binderl FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)

96,343 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 1978).
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resentations of the promoter, both written and oral. The defendants had urged that the court consider only the purchase agreement, a short form document. This the court refused to do be32
cause to do so would have been inconsistent with Joiner.
Another consideration in determining whether investment
contracts are securities is the subjective motivation of the purchaser. Other than to note that various plaintiffs in Woodward
had different motivations for purchasing the lots in Stansbury
Park, :3 Judge Breitenstein wisely declined to decide the case on
the basis of the purchasers' subjective motivations. There was
language in the Supreme Court's Forman decision which might
have led him to do so. In support of its holding that the "expectation of profit" element of Howey had not been met, the Court
noted that "[ijn the present case there can be no doubt that
investors were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a
place to live, and not by financial returns on their investments.13
Common sense would have supported an assertion that most of
the Woodward plaintiffs were "acquiring a place to live." In another recent case involving a real estate development, Fogel v.
Sellamerica, Ltd.,3 the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York focused upon the subjective motivation of
the purchasers: Did they or did they not purchase the lots for
investment purposes? 36 Under this rationale some buyers would
have purchased a security while others would have merely purchased a lot. Courts inclined to follow this deceptively simple
approach may find themselves mired in speculation over the
dominant motivation of purchasers.
Finally, McCown, 37 Jenne,3' and Foge 39 appeared to involve
land for vacation or retirement homes, whereas Woodward appeared to involve a typical residential development."0 Circum"

Id at 93,166.
574 F.2d 1023, 1025.

421 U.S. 837, 853 (1975).
445 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
Id. at 1277-78. The court found support for this analysis in McCown. Id. at 1278.
" 527 F.2d at 210 (lots for "individuals to construct a home and retire, all in a scenic
and recreation area").
[1978 Transfer Binderl FEn. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,343 at 93,164 (semi-arid land
in New Mexico), at 93,167 (other litigation pending across the country).
"' 445 F. Supp. at 1272 (plaintiffs who were New York residents purchased lots in the
Pocono mountains of Pennsylvania).
11 574 F.2d at 1024 (a planned residential community). See also. Note. Recreational
Land Subdivisions As Investment Contract Securities, 13 Hous. L. Rav. 153 (1975).
"
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stances surrounding the marketing of vacation homes would more
easily support the finding of an investment contract. As a policy
matter there may be valid reasons to keep the typical sale of
residential real estate beyond the purview of the securities acts.4
As a practical matter, developers should avoid certain representations until this area of the law becomes settled. 2
III. THE LOAN COMMITMENT: McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v
First of Denver Mortgage Investors3
Just as the securities laws have stopped somewhat short of
absorbing all real property transactions, they have not reached all
commercial transactions. The concept of a "commercialinvestment dichotomy" has been offered as an aid to analyzing
whether commercial loan transactions are securities."
A.

Facts of the Case
In furtherance of its plan to build a hotel, the plaintiffs obtained a construction loan commitment from defendant First of
Denver, and a permanent loan commitment from defendant B.F.
Saul Advisory Co.45 Plaintiffs alleged that there had been a misrepresentation of material facts. In any event, the loan commitments were not carried out and the hotel was not built; the plaintiffs sought an anti-fraud remedy under the securities acts."6
" See generally, Berman & Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condom iniums, Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. LAw. 411 (1975).
11 Id. at 430-31.
The authors counsel developers to avoid representations concerning the increasing
value of property and income or tax benefits of ownership. Mandatory collateral services
should be avoided. The purchase of multiple units by single purchasers should be discouraged because it suggests specualtion. Futhermore, the authors advocate that developers
keep a careful watch on salesmen, that they require purchasers to sign a statement acknowledging that they are buying for current or future residential use, and that they tape
the closing transaction to "provide a permanent record of the parties' state of mind."
13 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See Comment, An Overview of Promissory Notes Under The Federal Securities
Laws, 6 FORDHAM URn. I. J. 529 (1978); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of
"Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB.
L. Rsv. 478 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commercial Notes].
" 562 F.2d at 646.
" Id. The applicable anti-fraud sections are § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77q (1976) and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976).
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B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion

Judge McWilliams noted that "[t]he plaintiffs were in no
sense relying on the efforts of either First of Denver or Saul to gain
their profits." 7 Thus the reliance element of the Howey test was
not met. An inquiry into the motiviation of the plaintiffs (presumably they wanted to build a hotel), or into the manner of the
lenders' promotions (the facts gave no indication of anything
other than private negotiations) would not have supported a finding of reliance in McGovern.
In addition, Judge McWilliams reasonably concluded that
the loan commitment was a commercial rather than an investment transaction. 8 He relied upon Zabriskie v. Lewis," a Tenth
Circuit case adopting a test of whether the transaction was of a
type in which stock was usually given.10 Under the facts of
Zabriskie, which involved a note given in consideration of funds
to promote a corporation, the answer was "yes." 5 ' In McGovern
the transaction was of a type in which stock is usually not given.
C.

Analysis

Many courts have employed the concept of a commercialinvestment dichotomy to analyze notes in order to escape the
literal language of the statutory definitions of a security.52 The
Tenth Circuit's Zabriskie opinion summarized the rationale of
the test:
This test is based upon the purpose of the Act to protect investors,
the "unless the context otherwise requires" language, and the practical considerations of subjecting commercial notes to the registration provisions of the Securities Act as well as fear of the resulting
litigation flooding the federal courts if commercial notes were in-

cluded .3
"

562 F.2d at 647.
IId.

507 F.2d 546 (loth Cir. 1974)
Id. at 551 In adopting the test, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval the student
comment, Commercial Notes. supra note 44.
" 507 F.2d at 551-52.
" See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah
v. First Nat'l Bank of Hereford. 495 F.2d 1109, 1111-14 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City
Investing Co.. 48. P.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
The definitions of a security in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts include "any note." See
note 2 supra.
507 F.2d 546, 551.
"

53
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While at least one commentator has formulated detailed criteria for application of the test,54 others have observed that the
test is more easily stated then applied.5 5 Although it may be of
little assistance in analyzing close cases, it is hard to fault the use
of the commercial-investment dichotomy analysis in McGovern.
The loan commitments were obtained to assure funds for the
hotel construction, a commercial project. Neither party contemplated that they were to stand on their own merits as investments. 6
The outcome in McGovern required the Tenth Circuit to
distinguish its own precedent, United States v. Austin, 57 which
had declared a loan commitment to be a security. Fortunately,
there was nothing inconsistent in the two decisions: "[w]hether
a particular investment constitutes a security depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case." 58 In Austin, the defendants
had conceived an ambitious scheme of issuing back-up commitments guaranteeing that others would make loans. Investors were
induced to purchase the commitments with the expectation of
immediately selling them at a profit. 5 Unfortunately, there is
language in McGovern which might lead one to believe that the
" Commercial Notes, supra note 44 at 510-24. The factors include use of the proceeds,
application of the Howey test, risk, numbers of notes issued, dollar amount of the transaction, time elements, and characterization of the notes on the relevant financial statements. The Ninth Circuit opinion in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252
(9th Cir. 1976), examined the character of a note using a list of substantially similar
factors.
" See, e.g., Lipton & Katz, Notes Are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763, 766
(1975); Comment, 30 VAND. L. Rav. 110, 117 (1977); Comment, Bank Loan Participations
as Securities;Notes, Investment Contracts, and the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy,
15 DuQ. L. REv. 261, 276-77 (1976-77); Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MARYLAND L. REV. 233, 243-44
(1976).
" One suggested criterion for analyzing a note is to examine the common expectations
of the parties: How would a reasonable businessman characterize the instrument? See
Commercial Notes, supra, note 44 at 510.
- 462 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
" Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 435 (10th Cir. 1973).
11 462 F.2d at 727-29. The Austin opinion provided scant analysis. Its language
seemed applicable to the loan commitment in McGovern:
[Tihis letter of commitment was sold for a substantial consideration,
and the buyer received what appeared to be an enforceable obligation which
contemplated the flow of funds. It indicated a binding and legally enforceable right. Therefore, we can find no fault with the ruling of the trial court
insofar as it regarded the-letter of commitment as plainly being a security.
Id. at 736.
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result in Austin differed (1) because it was a criminal case, and
(2) because "[tlhe entire procedure was fraudulent an no loans
were ever made."10 The existence of a security should not depend
upon the nature of the action, civil or criminal, nor should it
depend upon the degree of fraud perceived by the court. Not
every fraudulent scheme involves a security.
IV. THE FRANCHISE: Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co."'
In 1975, in an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court for the District of Utah, which had
granted defendant Montgomery Ward's motion to dismiss the
action on the grounds that its catalog sales agency agreement
with the plaintiff could not be a security. 2
Were the Howey test to be interpreted literally in that profits
must have come solely from the efforts of others, 3 the Utah court
would have been correct. Furthermore, it would be useless to
question franchises or any other investment contract, since clever
counsel could help their clients design schemes in which a token
amount of investor effort would defeat the application of the securities laws.'
The Tenth Circuit has now concluded that the catalog sales
agreement was not a security;" its consideration of the factors
which went into this determination merits some discussion.
A.

Facts of the Case

The opinions in both the instant case and the earlier case
were silent concerning the gravamen of plaintiff's injury. One can
only infer that the catalog sales agency was less than successful.
Although the plaintiff was required by the agreement to
"devote his full time and best efforts to the operation of the
Agency," 6 the factual question of the amount of control actually
exercised by Montgomery Ward was critical.
562 F.2d 645, 648.
570 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1978).
' The case has now been published at 570 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1975).
328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
' One commentator has suggested that the promoters in Howe could have avoided
the application of the securities laws by requiring each investor to pick one orange. See
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. Rav. 135. 145 (1971).
570 F.2d 877, 878.
U 570 F.2d 875, 876.
"
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The Tenth Circuit Opinion

Judge Breitenstein reaffirmed the Tenth Circuit's alignment
with other circuits that have modified that part of the Howey test
which directed that profits were to come solely from the efforts
of others. 7 The Tenth Circuit's position was that the franchisee's
"control over the factors essential to success of the enterprise"
would preclude existence of an investment contract." The operator of the catalog agency had some discretion in pricing, credit,
and advertising policies. He was responsible for hiring and firing
employees, together with all of the day-to-day operations of the
business. Thus the court concluded that in economic reality "the
contributions of the franchisees significantly and substantially
affect[ed] the profits expected from the enterprise.""
C. Analysis
Many cases have considered and rejected the contention that
a particular franchise agreement was a security.70 Among them is
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City
Steak, Inc.,7" which provides more than adequate support for the
court's holding that the agreement between Crowley and Montgomery Ward did not constitute an investment contact.
" See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974) ("a
literal application of the Howey test would frustrate the remedial purposes of the Act");
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) ("an investment contract can
exist where the investor is required to perform some duties, as long as they are nominal
or limited . . ."); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 821 (1973) ("[W]e adopt a more realistic test, whether the
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones .... ").
The Supreme Court has yet to put its imprimatur upon this expansion. In United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court acknowledged the
variation and explicitly declined to comment upon it. Id. at 852 n.16.
U 570 F.2d at 880.
0 Id. at 881.
70 Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co.,
487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Nash & Assocs. v. Lum's of Ohio, 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973);
Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
Cases which have held to the contrary have involved pyramid schemes, in which the
promoter stresses the amount of money the participant can make by recruiting others to
participate: SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 821
(1973).
For a balanced discussion of most of these cases, see Freedman, An Analysis of the
Franchise Agreement Under Federal Securities Laws, 27 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 919 (1976).
"1 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972) aff'g 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970).
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In Mr. Steak, the franchisee essentially abdicated all managerial responsibility for running the franchised restaurant. He
could have selected the manager, but the franchisor was responsible for training the manager, who then held his job at the franchisor's sufferance." Other than this option to select a manager
(which was not exercised), the scope of the franchisee's authority
was severely circumscribed." Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit
held that the mere possibility of control constituted sufficient
participation in the enterprise to controvert the implication of an
investment contract.74 However, the fact that the court had so
thoroughly examined the relationship between the parties demonstrates its unwillingness to apply the Howey test in mechanical
fashion."
When the facts of Mr. Steak are compared to the facts of
Crowley one must wonder why the court found it necessary to
remand the latter case for further factual determination. While
the franchisee in Mr. Steak merely could have selected a manager, the Crowley plaintiff's agreement with Montgomery Ward
required that he "devote his full time and best efforts to the
operation of the Agency."" It is puzzling that when Crowley was
first before the Tenth Circuit in 1975, the court did not cite its
opinion in Mr. Steak for the quantity or quality of managerial
control necessary to preclude the existence of an investment contract.r7
Abuses in the burgeoning franchise method of doing business
have led some commentators to suggest that franchisees need the
protection of the Securities Acts.7" However, the SEC, in agreement with most courts, has taken the position that "true fran, 324 F. Supp. at 643.
" In particular, the financial control exercised by the franchisor was comprehensive.
Id.
' 460 F.2d at 670.

, The detailed analysis was contained in the district court opinion of Judge Arraj at
324 F. Supp. 640, which the Tenth Circuit gratefully adopted. See 460 F.2d at 669.
570 F.2d 875, 876.
7 Mr Steak was cited for the proposition that courts should give consideration to the
tfcts in determining the existence of an investment contract. 570 F.2d at 880.
It was apparent that the Tenth Circuit disapproved of the lack of analysis in the trial
court's order of dismissal. Id.
11See, e.g., Comment, Compelling Full Disclosure in FranchiseAgreements, 5 CuM.SAM. L. REv. 501 (1975); Comment, What is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises, And
FranchiseAgreements, 22 KAN. L. REv. 55 (1973).
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chising" is distinguishable from pyramid marketing schemes and
that the former is normally not an investment contract."' Therefore, the decision in Crowley would seem to have ample support
even under an interpretation of the investment contract in which
profits are not required to come solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party.
V.

CONCLUSION

It cannot be assumed that future cases bearing some resemblance to the cases discussed herein will be decided in the
same way. This caveat, rather than expressing criticism of the
Tenth Circuit's analytical approach, merely recognizes that the
determination of a security is a "shifting, highly fact-oriented
determination. '"80 However, given the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements on the securities laws, 8 it seems unlikely that
the Tenth Circuit will adopt an expansive definition of a security.
Elaine A. Menter
SEC Securities Act Release, No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971), reprinted in 11971-1972

Transfer Binderl Fem. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 78,446.
0 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975).
" See note 27 supra.

